Article

Securitization and the Political Variable—The United States and Britain as Case Studies

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Abstract: Securitization theory describes a process by which an ordinary political issue is transformed into a security issue. In this way, it is possible to take extraordinary measures in the name of security. Securitization theory suggests that the issues that become securitized are not necessarily essential to the objective survival of a state but rather represent issues that elite groups have successfully deemed necessary for a state's survival. This article seeks to extend the theory to include the political variable of an interest group as part of the criteria that transform a subject from being political to securitized. This article argue policymakers may choose not to include a particular group or segments of it in the category of 'security threat' because of the electoral variable that could affect their governance or potential election. This article will make a comparatively analyze the nature of the legislation, political language, and foreign policy in both the United States and Great Britain after Muslim citizens of both countries carried out terrorist attacks between the years 2001–2020. The hypothesis is that Britain, because of the inherent political potential of its Muslim community, prefers not to significantly transform Islamic terrorism into a security issue, while the United States does not consider the Muslim minority to be politically important and therefore reacts more harshly to the Muslim minority in the country after any kind of Islamic terrorist attacks on its soil. This article offers a new understanding of the importance of the political variable within the securitization theory.

Keywords: securitization theory; legislation; political language; foreign policy; Islamic terrorism; political variable

1. Introduction

In 2015 Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez, a Muslim American citizen, opened fire on two military installations in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Four Marines and a Navy sailor died on the spot, while a naval recruiter and a policeman were injured [1]. In response to that attack, then Vice-President Joe Biden said,

> These perverse ideologues, warped theocrats, they may be able to provoke a single lone wolf to commit a savage act, but they can never, never threaten who we are [⋯] When this perverted jihadist struck, everyone responded [⋯] We have a message for those perverted cowards around the world: America never yields, never bends, never cowers, never stands down, but endures, responds and always overcomes. For we are Americans, and never, never underestimate us. It's always been a bad, bad bet to do that [2].

In contrast, in 2013, two British Muslim citizens, Michael Olumide Adebolajo and Michael Oluwatobi Adebowale, ran over, stabbed, and beheaded a British Army soldier in London. Britain's Prime Minister David

Cameron responded to the attack by saying, 'This was not just an attack on Britain and on the British way of life. It was also a betrayal of Islam and of the Muslim communities who give so much to our country', and 'We will defeat violent extremism by standing together […]' [3].

Both the United States and Britain have nurtured a special relationship for many years as close military allies and partners in NATO. They also share a similar history, religion, language, and legal system. Together they represent a significant portion of world trade and influence policy and culture around the world [4]. Therefore, examining the implementation of the policy in each country is likely to have significance in the international arena as well.

This comparative case study covering the years 2001–2020 will analyze the United States and Britain's securitization reactions in response to Muslim terror attacks on their own soil. The main argument is that the US response and the transformation of Islamic terrorism since 9/11 into a security issue is more significant, consistent, and stronger than Britain's response. The 9/11 attacks resulted in a change in the US securitization policy. According to the academic literature, this was the largest terrorist attack that the United States had known, affecting other countries directly and indirectly [5]. A similar security threat has not been seen since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 [6]. This terrorist attack created a new perspective on Islamic terrorism; the rules changed, and the policy toward Islamic terrorism became stricter [6].

This article seeks to expand upon the current understanding of the securitization theory. The securitization theory is defined as a process of turning ordinary political issues into security ones, with this process allowing the use of extraordinary measures in the name of security. These issues revolve around situations around which an elite group succeeds at framing them as existential problems [7]. The main argument presented here is that an issue or population becomes securitized when the decision-makers and policy-shapers perceive the inherent political variable as being insignificant. The opposite is also true if the subject or population has high political significance.

The underlying assumption is that the political influence of the Muslims citizens in the United States and the United Kingdom affects the policy implemented against domestic Islamic terrorism, and that the difference between the countries is reflected in the way the policy is implemented after Islamic terrorist attacks. This article argues that by viewing the British Muslim community as an important political component in society and as having significant electoral power, Britain has pursued policies that reflect the community's magnitude and position and has refrained from turning the Muslim community into a security issue, despite the number of terrorist attacks associated with it. In contrast, the United States has pursued policies that do not recognize the strength and unique position of the American Muslim minority and have not taken into consideration the community when adopting its policies, leading the United States to perceive its Muslim population as a security issue.

To better understand the policy following the terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2020 in the United States and Britain, this article considers (1) the nature of the legislation and its implementation; (2) political language; and (3) foreign policy. These criteria can explain the nature of the policy and how it is implemented. After presenting the findings, this article will provide an alternative explanation for the differences between the securitization in the two countries, as well as the characteristics of the Muslim community in each. The tracing method, which traces the relationship between cause and effect, has aided with this argument [8]. The findings are based on an analysis of primary sources that relate to the political power of the Muslim minority in each country, including government statements and responses, policy implementation, official data, and programs of both US and British government institutions, as well as opinion polls of research institutes. Existing theoretical literature and studies also support the study's claim.

2. Literature Review

The academic literature on securitization describes and analyzes the variables that can lead to securitization, particularly that of the Muslim minority in Western democracies. However, the issue of the political reason that promotes or prevents the securitization of an expression of terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism, is hardly discussed.

The main purpose of securitization is to deal with a threat against a sovereign state. According to the concept of securitization, a national security policy is not a natural given but is carefully defined by politicians and decision makers [7]. Buzan, Waever, and Wilde state that 'security is a move that takes politics beyond the

fixed rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special type of politics or as above politics' [7]. Similarly, Eroukhmanoff presents the basis of securitization theory as political and non-neutral [9]. The concept of securitization can therefore be considered a more extreme version of politicization [9]. Accordingly, political subjects can be perceived as extreme security issues that are 'dangerous', 'threatening', 'worrying', and so forth and which must be addressed urgently. The securitization process is carried out by security actors who have the social and institutional power to move the issue 'beyond politics' [10]. Therefore, security problems are not simply 'out there' but rather must be articulated as problems by the security actors. While the issues may not be threatening in themselves, treating them as a security problem establishes them as such. A subject has been successfully securitized when the government and the population have as little resistance as possible to the securitization process [7].

This article will present those issues and will add the political variable as a reason for activating or not activating securitization towards an interest group.

Bigo, Bonditti, and Olsson present a state's security forces as playing an important role in defining the security landscape [11]. According to their research, the field of security is characterized by competition for the 'correct' knowledge and solution. Security actors are paramount because they help frame storylines about the existentially threatening nature of the issue [12]. Similarly, according to Emmers, elected officials will choose not to vote on an issue in the process of being securitized in order to increase their popularity to increase their chances of being re-elected [13].

Securitization of religion became significant with the emergence of the modern nation-state, which, in part, is characterized by religious security. The securitization of religion is done by both diminishing the religion as being a source of sovereign knowledge to that of a private belief and by subjecting it to a sovereign power [14].

Scholars see Islam as an extraordinary threat, as they perceive it as rejecting the secular dimensions of Western modernity by refusing to separate between religion and politics, and between private and public [15].

The 9/11 terrorist attack unleashed a global rhetorical attack that framed Islam as a threat and therefore justified the most extreme security measures directed at the Muslim population [16]. The purpose of these procedures that came in the wake of 9/11 was to increase the powers of the government and weaken the court system, for example, enabling the government to monitor individuals or groups without judicial authorization, from the rationale of reducing the programming of terrorist acts [17].

This security perspective was incorporated into American foreign policy and reflected the beginning of 'war on terror', first in the United States and then in Europe. The war on terror also led to growing suspicions about the loyalty of Muslims within their own communities. By perceiving Muslims as a homogeneous body, the United States, and the West construed Muslims as the 'other' [18], making it increasingly possible to perceive them as threatening and disloyal. The post 9/11 reality was framed as a new transatlantic space where people were disconnected from national connections and borders [19]. In other words, the physical distance is not a factor in carrying out joint acts of terrorism by operatives scattered in different parts of the globe. Surveillance operations in Muslim communities increased, based on the assumption that they fit the profile for terrorism [20]. This growing perception of Islam in Western societies as a security threat, which enabled the United States and the West to resort to 'extraordinary' measures, corresponds with the main characteristics of the securitization theory [21]. This research seeks to shed light on the political variable of a minority group and its significance during the securitization process.

Cesari has claimed that the discrimination against Muslims in Europe may stem from their class status and not from their religious identity, since the majority of European Muslims tend to be marginalized from a socioeconomic perspective. Hence Cesari argues the European states are essentially 'ordering securitization'. Namely Expanding powers and legislation against terrorist attacks made the public suspicious of Muslims, even though terrorism does not only stem from Islamic radicalism. Securitization causes suspicion, and because of their objective failure, the result, according to Cesari, is resentment toward the Muslim minority [19]. Similarly, Vesteinsson found that the securitization of various figures who are Muslim or associated with Muslim-majority countries had contributed to Islam being considered a single marker for a potential terrorist; that is, Muslims have a high potential to be securitized due to the adoption of an unusual securitization policy aimed at them

specifically [22].

In Britain, despite the government's desire to reduce terrorist attacks on its soil using various measures such as deportation, arrests, and preventing the entry of suspicious parties, such measures were not implemented due to judicial activism of the by the Supreme Court in Great Britain [23]. The British government's policy for acts of terrorism by its Muslim citizens is pronounced an understanding to not securitize Islam and to keep the Muslim community as an interested party out of the media discourse. Britain treats home-grown terrorists as if they come from an imagined community [24]. Moreover, securitization stems from the specific culture of the securitizing country and from previous securitization moves [25], which Britain has not done previously. This article claim is that one of the reasons to refrain from securitizing Islam and the Muslim minority is the significant electoral variable found among them.

Tumlin claims that securitization in the United States exists as an excuse for having a negative policy towards potential immigrants. However, many Americans see no problem in sacrificing immigrant rights for national security [26]. Jackson has claimed that after 9/11, terrorism has been translated into Islam and vice versa [27]. This is how in the broader discourse, radical fundamentalism has come to be seen as part of the Islamic mainstream. Other studies that linked the 9/11 attacks to immigration policy found that there is a 'memory' associated with terrorism, leading to long-term effects of the policymaking toward it; that is, according to the researchers, the 9/11 attacks are still relevant to decisions regarding terrorism even over 20 years later [28]. Fox and Akbaba further suggest that securitization is a process that includes a discourse built around an Islamic threat that is perceived as promoting actions outside the normal boundaries of political procedure that require the commitment of greater resources to eliminate it [29].

Securitization studies have also mentioned the electoral issue. Helbling and Meierrieks have argued that voters may hold the government accountable for negative economic effects stemming from terrorism, such as harm to investments and inbound tourism [28]. Some scholars have pointed to the component of fear and other forms of psychological distress that can be manifested during elections [30]. When terrorism occurs, Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong have indicated that voters can be expected to punish the government at the ballot box for its failure to maintain civil security [31]. A study by Wright and Esses found that there would be strong support for Donald Trump and higher chances of winning the presidential election because voters perceived immigrants, that is, Muslim immigrants, as an economic threat and Trump's policies would thwart their immigration [32].

In studies analyzing US and UK policies toward Islamic terrorism, scholars have indicated several factors that can explain the ways in which securitization is implemented. However, these studies do not shed light on the electoral component as an important variable that can explain why governments choose to securitize a specific community, nor do they show that groups of voters are significant enough to cause the government to react in a biased way towards terrorist incidents committed by members of the group it wants to convince to support them, or to react strongly when it does not see these groups as a significant electoral asset.

3. The Muslim Community in the United States and Great Britain

This part of the article will present the main characteristics of the Muslim minority in the United States and Great Britain. This is significant for understanding the meaning of the political variable of the Muslim minority in each country.

3.1. The Muslim community in Great Britain

Britain's colonial past may have given it an advantage in shaping its current relationship with Islam. Muslim immigration to Britain dates to 1700 and was of importance in the decades following World War II and the collapse of the colonial power [33]. Britain gave Muslims significant roles in government, which led to a comfortable social and political integration and, as a result, to increasing their political power [34].

Demographically the number of Muslims in Britain has been steadily increasing since 1950 [35]. Most of them live in England and are found in high concentrations in central cities such as London, Birmingham, Luton, and Bradford. Their significant demographic concentration has a real and direct effect on their electoral and social power. Despite their migration from different Muslim countries. Most of the Muslim community in Great

Britain manages in a uniform manner in regards to the realization of their community interests and the desire to preserve homogeneity and a significant religious space for them [36].

The Muslim community in Great Britain sees itself as part of the larger Muslim community of Western Europe, which affects the community's lifestyle and identity [37]. The desire to promote its religious worldview is reflected in the utilization of the democratic approach to community interests. Potential elected officials who are interested in political support promise to uphold the community's wishes.

This article argue that the Muslim community creates an identity-based difference between them and the general population, which affects the strength of their political power. The government grants autonomy in religious education and family law, and in return the minority grants its voice in the elections. The result is a diminishing civic identity and an increasing ethnic identity [20].

3.2. The Muslim Community in the United States

The United States is considered a nation of immigrants. About one-fifth of the world's immigrants live in the United States. This is three times greater than the number of immigrants arriving to any other country [38]. The number of Muslims in the United States is about 1.1%. This compares to 68.6% Christians, 1.75% Jews. About 15.9% who have no religion [39]. American Muslims are considered to be one of the most diverse ethnic groups. 25% are African American, 24% white, 18% Asian, 18% Arab, 7% mixed, and 5% Japanese. 84% of the Muslims living in the United States are American citizens, and about half of them were born to US citizens [40].

These data suggest that the Muslim community in the United States is ethnically complex. This article argue that these differences create a community that is not unified, and one that is not politically coherent. In terms of identity, the American Muslim community, for the most part, sees itself as American first and Muslim second; it also sees itself as an integral part of the general population [41]. This worldview of the American Muslim community indicates a desire to be part of the majority, and it is most prevalent in the public and political sphere [42]. The inhomogeneity of the American Muslim community and the lack of a unified identity make it difficult to form any kind of cooperative collective body that can provide significant electoral support for political candidates [43]. The need to hide their religious differences is stronger than their desire to be part of an isolated Muslim community. Moreover, they see the United States as a place where they can achieve personal prosperity and social mobility [44]. Therefore, this article contend that the totality of the components of the American Muslim community produces little political power. The desire to be part of the general American public and to obscure their religious diversity outweighs aspirations to preserve the ethnic uniqueness of the American Muslim community.

In conclusion, the Muslim minority in Britain behaves as a unique minority with distinct ethnic characteristics from the rest of the population. Britain recognizes and promotes its diversity, to achieve to gain the political support of the Muslim minority. In contrast, the American Muslim minority does not seek to exist in a distinct or unique way. Its political weight does not play a role in the determining of state decisions [45], despite the significance of interest groups as a political variable particularly in election campaigns.

4. Antiterrorism Legislation in the United States and Britain Since 2001

Although the level of terrorism in both countries is the same relative to the population, this article contends that Britain's approach to combatting terrorism is less effective than that of the United States. This is due to Britain's approach to the Muslim community, which is characterized by patience, a nuanced understanding, and a tailored response to the specific characteristics of the Muslim minority.

Conversely, the US strategy of securitization exhibits a lack of consideration for the Muslim minority, a stance that I argue can be attributed to the limited political influence of the Muslim minority in the United States. Prior to 9/11, both Britain and the United States had experienced mostly domestic terrorist attacks, perpetrated by their own citizens. The 9/11 attack marked not only a shift toward international terrorism but also prompted a change in policy toward terrorism [46]. As then US President George W Bush articulated, 'The world has come together to fight a new and different war [···] A war against anyone who seeks to export terrorism, and a war against the governments that support or sponsor them' [47]. Consequently, Britain was compelled to adopt policies toward its Muslim minority citizens that associated Islamic terrorism with

extremism, moving the focus away from territorial or state borders [48].

Islamic terrorism in Britain and the United States markedly increased following 9/11 (see Table 1).

Table 1. Summary table of total injuries and deaths in Britain and the US as a result of Islamic terrorist attacks.

Year	Total Terrorist Attacks in the UK	Number of Injured in the UK	Number of Deaths in UK	Total Terrorist Attacks in the US	Number of Injured US	Number of Deaths in the USA
2001	1	120		1	10,000	6000
2002						
2003						
2004						
2005	2	700	57			
2006				1	9	-
2007	1	5	1			
2008						
2009				1	1	1
2010						
2011						
2012						
2013	1	-	1	1	264	3
2014				4	7	1
2015				3	28	23
2016				4	107	52
2017	4	217	35	2	13	9
2018						
2019	1	3	3	1	8	4
2020	3	11	4			
Total without 9/11/2001	12	936	101	18	437	93
Total with 9/11/2001	13	1056	101	19	10,437	6093

Global ties between Muslim citizens and organizations and countries that either did not support Britain and the United States or were hostile to them contributed to the perception of terrorism as being an international issue [49]. This view reached its zenith in the United States, when it bypassed the authority of the UN Security Council and led, together with Britain, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, further emphasizing the international aspect of terrorism [50].

Both the United States and Britain seek to prevent, as much as possible, the recurrence of terrorist attacks in the future and therefore have passed legislation that addresses terrorist attacks to combat and deter terrorism. In general, both countries have found it difficult to operate warning systems against potential suicide bombers by conventional means. As a result, the United States has understood that the array of responses to this type of terrorism must be different [51], even if it means direct and indirect attacks on the Muslim community at home and abroad. In contrast, Britain has struggled in dealing with Islamic terrorist threats and has faced challenges in implementing a continuous and uniform policy in the face of this threat. This is despite Britain's existing experience vis-à-vis the Irish underground [52], and with internal and external Islamic forces [52].

4.1. Anti-Terrorism Legislation in the United States

The United States perceives terrorism not only as an attack on the American nation but also as an attack on the entire international community. In its view, terrorism disrupts international peace and can indirectly affect American sovereignty and international interests.

After 9/11, the United States ratified Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter as the law of the land. The law prohibits the threat or use of force in territorial territory against political sovereignty, except in circumstances where there is authorized authorization by the United Nations or when a state is required to defend itself in the face of a security situation threatening it from outside or from within [53]. Other legislation ratified was the USA Patriot Act. This law gave authorities broad authority to surveil, detain, and deport immigrants suspected of terrorist activity. Of all US citizens, the American Muslim community has been the most targeted by this law [54].

Following a terrorist attack at the Ohio State University in 2016, the US Department of the Treasury blocked the bank accounts within US jurisdiction of Abdullah Ibrahim al-Faisal, US citizen [55]. According to the Department of Treasury, al-Faisal, provided recruitment services to ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and helped influence the student at Ohio State to carry out the attack. The Department of Treasury applied Executive Order 13224 for aiding, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to, or support for ISIS to all of Faisal's property [55]. The US Treasury Department determined that Faisal was a target for global terrorism, and on 13 August 2020, Faisal was extradited to the United States and charged with counterextremism [55].

Executive Order 13769 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (2017) was intended to prevent the admission of terrorists into the United States. Politically labeled the 'Muslim Ban' by then President Trump, this order was directed primarily at citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, which were all defined as being a state sponsor of terrorism, as having been significantly harmed by terrorism, or as containing active conflict zones. As a result of this order, these countries were less willing to share or verify important information about individuals seeking to enter the United States, leading to an ease in revoking citizenship or deportation from the United States [56]. While the order reduced the number of potential immigrants who could enter the United States, it also indefinitely suspended the admission of Syrian refugees and prevented immigrants whose countries did not meet the jurisdictional standards under the US immigration law from entering the United States for ninety days [57].

Another executive order, Executive Order 13815 Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities (2017) gave greater vetting capabilities to admitting refugees in the United States. Section 6.1 of this order directed that the USRAP review process be strengthened. It also allowed the Secretary of State to suspend decisions on refugees who sought to enter the United States under this program. The US administration had claimed that terrorist groups sought to infiltrate the United States through refugee programs; as a result, more than 300 people who entered as refugees were subjected to anti-terrorism investigations by the FBI [58]. In 2020, President Trump took advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic and decided to close consulates and embassies and ban the issuing of diversity visas and foreign worker visas until the end of 2020, particularly to citizens from Arab Muslim countries [59].

These harsh laws and decisions targeting the Muslim population in the United States illustrate the minimal influence that the American Muslim minority has [60].

4.2. Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Britain

Britain is challenged to implement ostensibly optimal legislative policies against terrorism. The argument that the implementation of legislation has not led to a deterrent policy regarding terrorist attacks, is evident by the significant turnover of anti-terrorism legislation.

Between 2001 and 2020, following terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim extremists, Britain passed 11 laws against terrorism [61], including amendments to existing laws against terrorism. The number of laws, the amendments, and the repeal of these laws reveal Britain's instability and the absence of a strong, clear policy toward terrorism. For example, after the London bombings on 7 July 2005 and 21 July 2005, the UK

government produced a new policy, allowing the foreign extremists who preach violence from within the United Kingdom to be detained and deported [62]. Human rights groups and Muslim leaders protested [63], with the House of Lords in 2007 rejecting London's new laws on the grounds that deportation and the severity of the damage to the value of freedom was disproportionate [64].

Following the 2020 terror attacks, Britain pledged to strengthen its terrorism laws, impose harsher prison sentences on those convicted of terrorism, and allocate more resources to prevent terrorism. However, this approach raised concerns about upholding human and civil rights. Boris Johnson, Britain's prime minister at the time, claimed that rehabilitation for convicted terrorists was rarely effective. In addition, the plan to reduce the amount of time that terrorists spent in prison by 17% was also deemed unsuccessful [65]. Due to the legislative policy and the terrorist attacks involving Muslims, the Muslim community in Britain came to be treated with suspicion, creating a climate of fear. However, Britain's insistence that the main threat was terrorism imported from abroad prevented the state from recognizing the threat perception of some members of Britain's Muslim community. Quick fixes that tend to ignore the real reasons behind the problem have underscored the difficulty in policy. Several new tools, such as remand extension and increased investment in probation, did not effectively address the issue of terrorism emanating from the local Muslim community [66].

British authorities often acknowledged that their ability to combat terrorism was limited. The issue of terrorism affected British election campaigns and put Prime Minister Theresa May and the defense establishment on the defensive. According to British police, it was nearly impossible to track 23,000 British suspects on the terror list, despite the enactment of new surveillance and supervision laws, especially those related to virtual space [66].

5. The Political Language in the United States and Britain After Domestic Islamic Terrorist Attacks

Political language is how state and senior officials express their policies [67]. Both the United States and Britain describe attacks attributed to Islamic terrorism in different ways, leading to divergent counter-terrorism policies between the two countries.

5.1. Political Language in the United States

After 9/11, US President George W. Bush stated that 'this crusade, the war on terror, is going to take a while' [68]. The president's remark was not made lightly but rather was directed deliberately toward the global Muslim community, by using the term 'crusade', suggesting that the war on terror was similar to the Christian crusades in response to Muslim expansion in the Middle Ages. This statement was one of many issued by US officials that has indicated that the United States has been more direct in its intentions and is willing to express its inner truth, even if it may offend the American Muslim community.

In 2009, Joe Biden, then US vice president, praised the survivors of the Little Rock recruiting office terror attack for their courage in their encounter with 'twisted terrorists, cowardly terrorists' and that they had 'become the face of America's resolve for the whole world to see' [69]. Similarly, following the 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack, US presidential candidates for the 2016 race Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump stated that the United States was at war [70]. Presidential candidate Chris Christie said then that 'this is a new world war and one that will not look like the last two. Here radical Islamic jihadists try every day to kill Americans, disturb and destroy our way of life' [71]. Similarly, presidential candidate Jeb Bush said that 'if it is a war and I believe it is, because they have declared war on us, we should declare war on them' [70].

Following the St. Cloud mall stabbing and bombings in New York and New Jersey in 2016, Donald Trump, then a presidential candidate, claimed that 'these attacks and many others have been made possible because of our highly open immigration system, which fails to properly screen people/families entering our country. Endangering all civilians […]. Trump's administration would accept only immigrants who love our country'. Trump further called for a total ban on Muslims entering the United States at this time 'until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on' [72]. In response to the Orlando nightclub shooting also in 2016, Trump tweeted: 'Appreciate the congrats for being right on radical Islamic terrorism, I don't want congrats, I want toughness & vigilance. We must be smart!' [73].

During the first year of Trump's presidency in 2017, there was discussion about chain migration, which allows US citizens to sponsor immediate family members for legal residency. The president maligned the plan and urged its repeal. He said, 'Do you think the country is giving us their finest? No, they're not [...]. They're giving us the opposite of their finest'. Referring to the visa lottery program and the chain migration program, Trump proclaimed that they 'are sick, demented laws that have to be changed [⋯] the people that are sent to our country are not the people that we want. They come in through the lottery, they come in through chain migration' [74]. Similarly, in response to a truck attack in New York City in October 2017, President Trump exclaimed that, 'I just ordered Homeland Security to step up our already extreme vetting program. Being politically correct is fine, but not for this!' Trump further called the terrorist 'a sick and deranged person' [75]. After a terrorist attack in Pennsylvania in December 2017, the acting press secretary of the Department of Homeland Security reiterated that

> both chain migration and the diversity visa lottery program have been exploited by terrorists to attack our country [...] The programs make it difficult to keep dangerous people out of the United States and to protect the safety of every American [76].

The political language used in the United States has expressed intolerance toward terrorism and those suspected of committing terrorist acts. The fact that this language has specifically targeted the Muslim population, directly and without any filters, attests to evidence of the insignificance that the government has attributed to the Muslim community. Given the political language used, it is also clear that the Muslim minority's position of power is also negligible.

5.2. Political language in Britain

Through its political language, Britain has emphasized its desire to distinguish between the Muslim community in Britain and Muslims in the rest of the world. Moreover, the British government has underlined the importance and significance of Britain's Muslim community and has been careful to convey tolerant and positive messages to it in the wake of terrorist attacks carried out by British Muslims.

In 2006, in a speech at Queen's College in London, Eliza Manningham Buller, the director general of the British Security Service, stated that

> I want to be very clear at this stage that I am not talking about a threat from Islam. It is true that terrorists use Islamic doctrine to provide justification for terrorist attacks. I don't see the Muslim community as a threat [77].

> Commenting on the 7 July 2005 London bombings, then Prime Minister Tony Blair remarked that

> It is clear that there are casualties and fatalities. It's a barbaric act [...] But one thing is important to clarify, and the perpetrators should internalize: Our determination is greater than their desire to cause destruction. No matter what they do, our determination will win in our country and all over the world [78].

According to Blair, these attacks were the result of the undemocratic nature of Islamic regimes, the conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians, and the backwardness and misery of the citizens in Muslim countries [78]. Blair's statement did not mention or refer to the perpetrators of the attack as being Muslim citizens of Britain. Similarly, Sir Ian Blair, then commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, insisted that police action was directed against 'criminals' and not against any particular community [79]. Referring to the attack and murder of the soldier Lee Rigby in 2013, then Prime Minister David Cameron stated that Britain would stand firm against radicalization and terrorism, adding that the attack 'was also a betrayal of Islam and of the Muslim communities who give so much to our country. We will defeat violent extremism by standing together' [3].

Similarly, following a terrorist attack in 2018, then Prime Minister Theresa May tweeted that 'My thoughts are with those injured in the incident in Westminster and my thanks to the emergency services for their immediate and courageous response' [80].

In response to this same attack, US President Donald Trump tweeted that 'these animals are crazy and must be

dealt with toughness and strength' [81]. The fact that the British prime minister referred to the attack as an 'incident' illustrates the semantic choice of minimizing the nature of the attack and of referring to it as an action that 'happened' and not as one that 'harmed'. By using the term 'incident', May suggests that addressing the harm and understand its roots is not an imperative. It is also downplaying the severity of the attack.

6. Policies toward Extraterritorial Terrorism Since 9/11 in Both the United States and Britain

Extraterritorial terrorism forces sovereign states to respond and be prepared should such terrorism also threaten the state. After 9/11, the United States and Britain responded to extraterritorial terrorism with very different policies. The United States acted directly and harshly to eradicate real and potential extraterritorial terrorism, with an emphasis on Islamic terrorism [47]. This policy did not take into account the attitude of the American Muslim community. As being an ally of the United States, Britain acts on the same issue. However, its policy does not seek to eradicate extraterritorial terrorism and tries to make a clear separation between the Islamic terrorist activity that is carried out outside the sovereignty of Britain and the civilian Muslim communities that live within it [82].

6.1. US Policy against Foreign Terrorism

US policy against foreign terrorism has been mainly toward potential immigrants and citizens with a Muslim identity. The policy was conducted with a suspicious and discriminatory view [83]. In the two years after 9/11, more than 5000 Arab-Muslim immigrants were arrested in the United States, often without basis other than ethnic-religious identity. Muslim foreign citizens were arrested as 'enemy combatants', and were held without any hearings or holding unfair hearings [84].

The Bush administration exercised almost unlimited authority to arrest anyone suspected of being an 'Enemy Combatant'. A regulation on behalf of the US Justice Department allowed the unlimited detention of foreign citizens who were subject to deportation from the country due to suspicion of supporting al-Qaeda or the Taliban. About 775 men were detained at Guantanamo under this definition [85]. The United States authorized the CIA and military investigators to use coercive law enforcement tactics such as forced sleep deprivation, stripping suspects, water deprivation, and physical violence [86]. People suspected of involvement in terrorism were transferred to the security services in the countries of Egypt and Syria, together with instructions for torture so that those security services could carry out investigations [86].

In 2016, with the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president, the White House released 'America's First Foreign Policy'. Among the objectives of this policy were 'defeating' ISIS and other radical Islamic terrorist groups and standing up to an enemy that celebrated death and worshipped annihilation [87].

6.2. UK Policy against Foreign Terrorism

As an ally of the United States, Britain took a stand against extraterritorial terrorism. However, unlike the United States, Britian did not initiate attacks to eradicate terrorists and tried to firmly distinguish between Islamic terrorism outside Britain's sovereignty and the Muslim communities and citizens within [83].

Following 9/11, Britain engaged in several actions. One was the promotion of the military operation Operation Herrick (2002 – 2014), in the framework of which all military operations in Afghanistan were conducted [88]. British Prime Minister Tony Blair justified Britain's entry into the operation during a speech after the 9/11 attack:

> This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism [...] Therefore, we here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy [...] We will not rest until this evil is driven from our world [...] The murder of British citizens, whether it happens abroad or not, is an attack on Britain. But even if no British citizen is dead, it would be right to act [...] We have a direct interest in acting in our own defense to protect British life [89].

Blair described the steps taken by Britain in its response to the attacks, of bringing those responsible to

justice, including those who sponsor terrorists; forging a joint alliance against terrorism and supporting any action; and rethinking the global scope of effort and action to combat terrorism [90].

Britain's desire to preserve human rights, however, outweighed its priority to maintain its security and that of its citizens. This argument was expressed for several reasons. First, in December 2004, judges in the House of Lords, Britain's highest judicial court, ruled that arrest orders for suspected terrorists should be revoked because they discriminated between foreign nationals and Britons [91]. Second, in 2001, the British Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which ordered indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects without charge or trial in order to combat domestic extremist terrorism. The law also provided for the implementation of the Terrorism Financing Convention, which included freezing orders against property obtained by terrorists and expanded police powers [91]. The law provided an emergency exception to Britain's obligation to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the House of Lords did not approve the exclusion because the practice of indefinite detention violated the ECHR. As a result, the law was repealed in December 2004 [92]. In 2011, the British government enacted the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, aimed at countering terrorism. This law abolished control orders and introduced a more targeted and less invasive preventative measure. The new system sought to ensure the safety of the public from individuals who posed a real terrorist threat. The law prohibited the prosecution or deportation of foreign citizens from the country and enhanced the protection of human and civil rights [93].

This and subsequent legislation enacted after 9/11, as well as Britain's political actions, did not express a coherent policy toward the new terrorist threats and reflected the dilemma facing policymakers between imposing restrictions and tightening security while also protecting human rights [83]. Despite the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001, Britain detained fewer than 20 foreign nationals indefinitely [91], compared to the United States, which held 5000 people in arbitrary detention, almost all of them Arab or Muslim. In April 2002, the British Foreign Secretary stated that 'the struggle for human rights should be a central part of the fight against terrorism and not an excuse for abolishing carefully observed human rights norms'. Moreover, in 2005, the House of Lords ruled that evidence obtained through torture by another government would not be admissible in an administrative proceeding in Britain [45], because torture violated the ECHR, to which Britain was bound.

It should be emphasized that even after Britain's exit from the European Union (Brexit), Britain is still bound by international human rights law and cooperation agreements together with the European Union. As a result, Britain has had to justify its actions not only domestically, but also to other EU countries. For example, in 2007, Britain asked the European Court of Human Rights to confirm that a domestic national security risk could justify deportation. The court rejected the request, and as a result, Britain held back in matters of detention and legislation [94].

After 9/11, the Defense and Overseas Policy (DOP), a committee of the Cabinet, decided to examine the British government's policy on international terrorism, focusing particularly on its ability to locate, capture, and convict suspected terrorists [24]. After 9/11, the Defense and Overseas Policy (DOP), a committee of the Cabinet, decided to examine the British government's policy on international terrorism, focusing particularly on its ability to locate, capture, and convict suspected terrorists. The commission did not result in any large-scale organizational changesת regarding the shared security goals of Britain and the United States in the war against Islamic terrorism. The main reason lies in the claim that Britain felt that the way the United States dealt with terrorism was neither appropriate nor necessary for Britain [95].

Britain's attitude toward domestic terrorism also influenced its relations with Arab and Muslim countries. For example, while Britain avoided blaming its own citizens who committed terrorist attacks, it did attempt to blame the countries of origin for the actions of these citizens. This point is reflected by a statement by Pervez Musharraf, then the president of Pakistan, who claimed that it was Britain, and not Pakistan, that was to blame for the terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005, in which 56 people were killed by four suicide bombers of Pakistani origin: 'Why blame us? [⋯]. Please put your house in order [⋯]. There is a lot to be done by Pakistan internally [⋯] and I can suggest that there is a lot to do in England as well' [79]. The fact that Pakistan was not afraid of accusing Britain, proved that it was aware of Britain's interest in having normal and productive

relations with its Muslim citizens. Britain refused to point out the countries of origin as supporting terrorism or blaming the situation [96]. However, Britain did not believe that terrorism in other countries would directly affect it, stating that geographical distance was an important factor in determining a threat [95].

Moreover, unlike the United States, which views terrorism as an act of war, Britain compares it to a crime scene [24]. This is partly due to Britain's economic interests in protecting its foreign investment, particularly in the oil and gas sector, in the Middle East; the presence of a significant Muslim community in Britain has created a fear of a backlash from their countries of origin if drastic action is taken [95]. It is evident that the United Kingdom conducts its policy against Islamic terrorism by clearly separating internal terrorism from its external influences, i.e., the countries of origin of the terrorists [79].

7. Conclusions

Securitization refers to a situation in which the policy makers determine that a certain matter is a security risk. The findings presented here indicate that the electoral variable influences the implementation of securitization. Securitization is weak when a particular interest group has more electoral power.

Despite both experiencing terrorist attacks, both the United States and Britain have pursued different policies regarding Islamic terrorism. The United States sees Islamic terrorism as a real threat both at home and abroad that must be dealt with consistently. The trauma that the country experienced after 9/11 has dictated the US policy against Islamic terrorism. The fear that 9/11 will be repeated, together with delivering a real blow to the prestige of the United States as a world power, characterizes every Islamic terrorist attack and related attempts [97]. The restrictions—travel bans, visa cancellations—as well as the political language used categorized the Muslim community as a source of potential terrorism and as a serious threat to the security of the state and its citizens [98].

In contrast to the United States, Britain's policy toward Islamic terrorism has been unpredictable, despite having extensively dealt with terrorist attacks by the Irish resistance [52]. After each attack, Britain has revealed the inconsistent nature of its policy by frequently amending the Terrorism Act, adding clauses and innovations based on the nature of the previous attack [99]. Britain has also tried to maintain a balance between the value of liberty and security, which has also undermined its security and threat prevention [100].

The political language that both US and British government officials have used, reveal how the two countries have pursued very different policies regarding Islamic terrorism. Senior US government officials after domestic terrorist attacks used language that was specifically directed toward the Muslim population. The choice of words like 'crusade', following the World Trade Center bombing, in reference to the medieval crusades of Christians against Muslims represented the belief in a comprehensive struggle of Christianity against Islam as a whole [68]. Moreover, phrases such as 'twisted terrorists', 'deviant ideologues', and 'deviant cowards' perpetrated by Muslim civilians illustrate this claim. In contrast, British leaders and government officials emphasized the importance of the Muslim community in Britain despite the terrorist attacks, and treated each attack as an incident that happened to arise from within the community itself but did not characterize it. The government sought to minimize the British Muslim community's role in all the terrorist attacks and to downplay any kind of connection to the attacks. For example, Manningham-Buller, director general of the British Security Service, stated that while terrorists used Islamic doctrine to justify attacks, the Muslim community was not considered to be a threat. In her view, terrorist actions betrayed Islam and the Muslim community [77]. As I have argued, the carefully chosen political language used by British government officials in the context of the reactions against terrorist attacks carried out by some members of Britain's Muslim minority suggest the importance of the community's potential political power and the caution that the British government took to not offend or endanger the Muslim community by acknowledging any links to terrorism.

Britain has been careful not to refer to the terrorists as Muslim or Islamic terrorists, or to mention that they come from within the British Muslim community. In addition, Britain has avoided referring to the terrorists as local Muslims living in Britain, but rather has referred to them as part of global Islam. Moreover, sometimes officials have referred to the attacks as 'violence' rather than as an 'attack', in attempts to downplay their scale. Similarly, the Metropolitan Police Chief Sir Ian Blair, referred to the death of a suspect at the hands of the police and that the police action was directed against 'criminals' rather than terrorists [79], again reducing the

scope of the terror attack into merely a crime. This downplaying of terrorism has created a reality that produces policy. The way Britain has chosen to talk about the terrorist attacks illustrates how the government has differentiated between the Muslim community and the terrorist attacks, which in turn has dictated policies that do not address the challenging circumstances that local terrorism from a minority community can cause.

This article have argued that Britain has sought to present a loose link between British Muslims and their countries of origin, as the importance of maintaining diplomatic relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa has prevented Britain from making security decisions that favor Britain and the safety of all its citizens. Instead, it has allowed British citizens from those countries to express themselves in a way that does not always adhere to Britain's democratic values. Mainly to Pakistan, to gain experience as terrorist operatives in designated camps [101]. Physical distance, in Britain's view, does not pose a real threat to Britain's security nor does it strengthen the likelihood of actual terrorist attacks [95].

As this article have shown here, the degree of political power of the Muslim minority in both the United States and Britain have a significant impact on the foreign policy a Britain's foreign policy regarding international security operations is relatively passive compared to that of the United States. United States has acted and continues to act aggressively and harshly to eradicate real and potential extraterritorial terrorism, with an emphasis on Islamic terrorism. This policy fails to consider the feelings of the American Muslim community [84]. However, even though Britain invests a large budget and significant personnel to succeed in military operations that it engages in, its main interests lie in preserving its oil and gas investments in the Middle East and in maintaining a positive relation with the large and significant Muslim populations within its territory. That is the main reason to Britian passive approach. Britain does not initiate military operations, it is willing to work together with its ally, the United States, in the struggle against terrorist organizations outside each country [95].

While existing literature indicates that the United States and Britain differ in their view of Islamic terrorism and its internal ramifications, the Muslim communities in the two countries also operate differently in accordance with US and British policies toward Islamic terrorism and its responses. The United States perceives Islamic terrorist attacks as threats that can also come from within, from among its own citizens [102], while Britain sees the terrorist threat as internal, and the external connection is not part of the equation [91]. Naturally, when an attack is carried out by terrorists from outside the borders of the country, the natural response is to fight back and divide the world into 'us' versus 'them'. As a result, demonization and inhumane treatment of suspects is highly likely. Seeking to protect the Muslim minority in its midst and not to create resentment toward the community nor within the community toward the British government, Britain's response to terrorism has been more measured and far more cautious than that of the United States. The British administration prefers to deal with terrorism through the criminal and administrative justice system of ordinary law rather than to initiate war or military intervention as the United States has done [45].

By examining legislation, political language, and foreign policy as they relate to Islamic terrorism in both the United States and Britain, it becomes clear that the United States has implemented policies against Islamic terrorism while taking into consideration the American Muslim minority and its insignificant role in American politics. The rigid position taken by the United States, together with the cooperation of various parties, while establishing an orderly continuous, and stable policy, testifies to this. In contrast, Britain had difficulty maintaining an orderly and effective policy for the signal and the threat. The strength of the Muslim minority in Britain and the willingness and desire of Britain to accommodate this community is a consideration in the government's decision-making when it comes to dealing with Islamic terrorist attacks coming from within the Muslim civil community in Britain.

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Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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