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https://doi.org/10.62836/emi.v5i2.0017
Liu, K. (2026). Reshaping Labor Relations in the Platform Economy: A Comparative Study of Algorithmic Control in China and the United States. Economics & Management Information, 5(2), 0017. https://doi.org/10.62836/emi.v5i2.0017
Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2026
Copyright (c) 2026 Kaiyi Liu
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Reshaping Labor Relations in the Platform Economy: A Comparative Study of Algorithmic Control in China and the United States

This study examines algorithm management in the platform economy, with a focus on food delivery platforms. It argues that such systems extend Taylorism, such as deskilling and centralized control, while introducing new elements of labor regulation, including implicit rules, pressure from multiple sources, and tracking beyond working hours. By comparing the situations in the United States and China, the article demonstrates that algorithmic control is mediated by distinct institutional logics. In the United States, enterprises set rules to consolidate their power and make work unstable, whereas in China, the government intervenes to achieve stability and common growth. However, both systems allow algorithms to dominate the workforce, underscoring the need for stronger protective measures to correct these imbalances.

algorithmic management platform labor labor control comparative study China–United States

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Supporting Agencies

  1. Funding: This research received no external funding.