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https://doi.org/10.62836/jissh.v3i2.0012
Neng, Y. (2026). Institutional and Non-Institutional Factors in Great Powers’ Strategic Decision-Making: A Case Study of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Journal of Integrated Social Sciences and Humanities, 3(2), 0012. https://doi.org/10.62836/jissh.v3i2.0012
Volume 3, Issue 2, 2026

Institutional and Non-Institutional Factors in Great Powers’ Strategic Decision-Making: A Case Study of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The war in Russia and Ukraine is a serious political problem for the whole world, and many states around the world have issued sanctions in response. Synthesize neoclassical realism and elite politics, draw case studies from academic research, policy reports and official statistics, and examine Russia’s strategic decision-making process. It is also believed that Russia’s decision to launch a large-scale military operation in Ukraine is not due to structural reasons, such as the expansion of NATO and a change in the balance of power. The conflict reveals that the structure of these constraints stems from a limited range of options among the top and operates through opaque internal mechanisms. Based on the study of institutional and informal factors under Putin, this paper presents both the speed of decision-making and significant strategic errors caused by authoritarian elite politics. This study has also found that there is an elite filter for authoritarian foreign policy and offers new ideas on the behaviour of great powers.

Russia-Ukraine conflict strategic decision-making elite politics neoclassical realism

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Supporting Agencies

  1. Funding: This research received no external funding.